

Democracy and capitalist revolution

Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira *

Democracy became the preferred and consolidated form of government only in the twentieth century. The new historical fact that led to the change of preference from aristocratic rule to democracy is the Capitalist Revolution, which changed the manner of appropriating the economic surplus from violence to the market. This is the first necessary condition for democracy. The disappearance of the fear of expropriation, the rise of middle classes, and the pressures of the poor are the complementary historical facts. After these four conditions were fulfilled, the elites ceased to fear that they would be expropriated if the poor won universal suffrage. The theory presented here does not predict transitions, since often countries under pressure from abroad turn democratic without the historical conditions being fully realized, but it predicts democratic consolidation, since no country that has completed its capitalist revolution falls back into authoritarianism.

La démocratie est devenue la forme privilégiée et consolidée de gouvernement seulement au xx^e siècle. Le fait historique nouveau qui a conduit au changement de préférence de la domination aristocratique vers la démocratie a été la Révolution capitaliste, qui a changé la manière de s'approprier le surplus économique du contrôle direct de l'État vers le marché. C'est la première condition nécessaire à la démocratie. La disparition de la peur de l'expropriation, la montée des

* Getulio Vargas Foundation, Sao Paulo, bresserpereira@gmail.com

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classes moyennes, et les pressions des pauvres sont des faits historiques complémentaires. Une fois que ces quatre conditions ont été remplies, les élites ont cessé de croire qu'elles seraient expropriées si les pauvres remportaient le suffrage universel. La théorie présentée ici ne permet pas de prévoir des transitions, car, souvent, par pression externe, les pays deviennent démocratiques sans que les conditions historiques soient totalement réalisées, mais il prédit la consolidation démocratique, car aucun pays qui a achevé sa révolution capitaliste retombe dans l'autoritarisme.

Democracy is today the prevailing and consolidated form of government in developed countries and tends to be so in the middle-income countries. Democracy has become such strong political value that nobody challenges it, and major countries feel authored to require from the others that they are democratic. Yet, this consensus is as recent as modern democracy itself. Advanced countries and many middle-income countries became real democracies only in the twentieth century, when the poor and the women finally won the right to vote and to be elected.¹ Why did democracy become the dominant form of government so late historically? Why, since the Greeks, did philosophers prefer some form of monarchy or aristocracy to democracy? Why are democracies consolidated in some countries while in others, not? Why are *coups d'État* so frequent in poor countries – countries that did not “complete” their capitalist revolutions?²

There are no simple answers to these questions, but I will offer some that I believe consistent with political theory and historical observation, and with the extensive empirical research undertaken by other political scientists on the subject. We know that economic development and democracy are linked. We know also that in the historical transi-

¹ In this paper I assume the existence, today, of three types of countries: rich, middle-income and poor countries. Rich and middle-income countries are the ones that are already fully or completely capitalist; poor countries are the ones that are attempting to make their national and industrial revolution (their capitalist revolution) but did not get to it yet.

² For instance, just in the printed edition of *The Economist* that I just read (December 11th 2010), there was report on recent coups in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. In Latin America, poor countries that elect left-wing presidents are permanently threatened by coups d'État.

tion from traditional to modern societies, in the capitalist revolutions taking place in each national state, a new and large bourgeoisie gradually assumed economic and political dominance and, eventually, came to support democracy after rejecting for a long time in name of liberalism. Thus, the capitalist class was the first ruling class to accept democracy. In this paper, I try to understand why this was so, discussing why the capitalist class removed successively its vetoes on democracy; and I hope to explain why democracy turn consolidated in rich countries and in an increasing number of middle-income countries, whereas it remained unstable in poor countries.

In this paper, I claim that the major new historical fact behind the rise of democracy was the Capitalist Revolution. I understand for it the formation of the modern nation-state and the industrial revolution and the corresponding change of the form of appropriating the economic surplus from the control of the state to the market that happened originally in the major European countries and in the United States. After the market turns into the major institution coordinating each national economic system, three subsequent historical facts – elites’ gradual loss of the fear of expropriation by a socialist working class winning elections, the rise of middle classes and the pressure from the poor and the middle classes for more democratic participation – led economic elites to suspend their veto to democracy. As we will see, these four historical facts explain why the bulk of democratic transitions and consolidations took place only in the twentieth century. Yet, in the case of democratic transitions, we have many exceptions to the model that I present in this paper, while, in the case of democratic consolidation, there are no exceptions: the occurrence of these facts and particularly of the capitalist revolution are the necessary and sufficient condition.

I know that there is not an “operational” definition of capitalist revolution – that is difficult to say that this or that country did complete its capitalist revolution and already counts with a large business class and working class and growing professional middle class, that in this country economic surplus is already appropriated mainly through the market on the form of profits. But in a paper like this one that considers *la longue durée* I don’t believe that we should ask for that. This is primarily a theoretical paper adopting the historical method; nevertheless, in the end I present some empirical evidence in relation to democratic consolidation.

I. – THE PHILOSOPHERS' VIEW

In the ancient world, the normative view about the good political regime was clear: it should be monarchical or aristocratic, not democratic. The most that philosophers could accept was Aristotle's "mixed regime", in which some aspects of democracy were combined with authoritarian rule. Since the philosophers' main political objective was social order or security, they were either outright authoritarian, like Plato, or moderate, like Aristotle and Polybius, who were concerned to balance rich and poor for the sake of both stability and justice. Democracy alone was dangerous, subject to factions, instability and corruption. Today, ancient Greek democracy cannot be viewed as true democracy, given the exclusion of women and foreigners and the existence of slaves. Only many centuries later, with the great revolutions in France and in the United States, inspired by Greek democracy and especially Roman republicanism (Pocock 1975), did democracy once again come into the minds of people as a possibility. Yet these were liberal rather than democratic revolutions: they gave priority to the protection of civil rights and the rule of law over the affirmation of political rights, particularly universal suffrage.

Politics – the art of governing through argument and compromise, and not just by the use of force – reappeared in the Italian merchant city-states with the republican humanists and their major representative, Machiavelli. After centuries, in a particular region of the world the times were suitable for doing and thinking politics. Yet, with the rise of the modern national-states in the form of absolute monarchies, such opportunities for politics and political thought seemed to fade. Not so. The Reformation changed Europe in political and cultural terms. On the other hand, given that the emerging nation-states were the outcome of a political alliance of the monarch with the emerging bourgeoisie, the members of this social class started to participate in the creation of new institutions. Eventually, with the American and the French revolutions, not only the fortune of markets but also the times of politics and of political thought gained a new momentum.

With industrialization, the capitalist revolution was completed in England, and shortly thereafter in France and in the United States. The new market economy required a non-arbitrary political regime: a liberal state, respectful of property rights and contracts, in which the rule of law prevailed, but not necessarily a democratic one. Political philosophers were still a long way from democracy; they lived in absolute

monarchies, and, realistically, saw the liberal or constitutional state, not democracy, as the alternative form of political regime. The absolute monarchies, however, were already a manifestation of the capitalist revolution, and, with Thomas Hobbes and the social contract theory, the legitimacy of political power was transferred from tradition or from divine right to the people. After that, a new breed of enlightened or liberal political philosophers emerged. Liberalism is originally the ideology of the bourgeoisie, but it involved a larger range of interests. After Locke, the first great liberal philosopher, liberal thinkers were constitutional monarchists. Liberalism was not an alternative to monarchy, but a form of constitutionally limiting the powers of the monarch.

With the American and the French revolutions, liberal ideology turned dominant, but the word and the demand for “democracy”, long forgotten, returned to public debate. In the American Revolution, democracy was rejected, and, as John Dunn [(2005), p. 72-73] remarks, only in retrospect, as America’s new constitution was put to work, and after Alexis de Tocqueville explained Americans to themselves, did the new nation view itself as a democracy. In the French Revolution, there was a radical democratic project, which proved self-defeating in the hands of the Jacobins. Jürgen Habermas [(1988), p. 465], writing on the French Revolution and on the dialectic between liberalism and democracy, emphasizes that “democracy and human rights form the universalistic core of the constitutional state that emerged from the American and French Revolutions in different variants”. However, such a universalistic core would take a century to become reality. After the two revolutions, liberals often identified democracy with the worst excesses of the French Revolution, or as the dictatorship of the majority. In light of their historical experience, liberal political philosophers – such as for instance Benjamin Constant – remained hostile to democracy, which would entail instability and disorder, thus demonstrating the inherent incapacity of the people to govern. Even Rousseau, who is usually associated with democracy, was not really in favor of modern, i.e., representative, democracy. Being a citizen of the republican city-state of Geneva, he believed only in direct democracy. For large empires, or even in nation-states, he had the same view as Montesquieu: government was much more complex and difficult, and there was no alternative to a kind of despotism. Rousseau would not accept the basic criterion distinguishing liberal from liberal-democratic regimes: the inclusion of women and the poor as citizens.

The liberals, who had been the dominant political philosophers since the eighteenth century, favored democracy only in the twentieth century. Before, they feared it: they worried that the poor would expropriate the rich and cause disorder. They accepted the liberal politicians' policy of granting voting rights to the people, but gradually, slowly. One reason for this, according to Norberto Bobbio [(1991), p. 26], was the classic conflict between reason and democracy.

In the great tradition of Western political thought, which began in Greece, the assessment of democracy, viewed as one of the three ideal forms of government, has been preponderantly negative: an assessment that is based on the assumption that democratic government, more than the others, is dominated by passions. As can be seen, exactly the opposite to reason.

In the second part of the nineteenth century, however, things began to change. For the market economy, a liberal political regime was not enough for protecting property rights and contracts. Democracy, which used to be a pejorative word, gradually underwent a transformation. In mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, following indications already existing in the work of Jeremy Bentham and of his own father, James Mill, was one of the first major philosophers to endorse democracy. Before that, we can also see a democratic tendency in Thomas Paine and in Tocqueville. According to C. B. Macpherson [(1965), p. 1-2, 9] pressure from those who had no vote but were part of the market process became irresistible; on the other hand, writing in the mid-1960s, he noted, "democracy used to be a bad word... Then, within fifty years, democracy became a good thing. Its full acceptance into the ranks of respectability was apparent by the time of the First World War".

Beginning in the more advanced nation-states at the end of the nineteenth century, universal suffrage was finally accorded in country after country. Since the other requisite to democracy had been reasonably achieved by the liberal state, this was the historical new fact that completed the transition to democracy. As Pierre Rosanvallon [(1992), p. 16] underlines in his history of the universal suffrage in France, "the universal suffrage is a kind of sacrament of the equality among men... it represents a fulfillment, the entry in a new age of the politic".

II. – SHORT REVIEW ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

There is a long tradition of research and thought on democratic transitions and consolidations that begins with Seymour Lipset (1959) and Philip Cutright (1963), uses an historical approach following loosely either Weber (modernization theory) or Marx (structural theory). Lipset's classic paper on development and democracy shows that the more advanced an economy is, the more democratic it will tend to be. Lipset uses theories of modernization, and stresses the importance of education – which is indeed important, but not enough to explain why democracy became the preferred form of government only in the twentieth century. In fact, his seminal paper establishes a correlation, not a causal connection. A series of other studies confirmed Lipset's original finding, but remained inconclusive in relation to the underlying cause.

In studying democratic transitions and consolidation, there are two alternative approaches to the historical one. The major study by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) on democratic transitions emphasized the particularities of each country in which the transition to, or the consolidation of, democracy took place, and attributed a major role to individuals and to the process through which authoritarian elites split between "soft liners" and "hardliners", a process that eventually led to the victory of the former. According to this approach, democracy is the result of changes in political institutions, processes, and leadership. An alternative is the rational choice approach, but, in so far as it is hypothetical-deductive and ignores history, it is by definition unable to explain historical facts. The former approach is too specific and involves a leadership aspect; the latter is too general; and both fail to consider the new historical facts and the structural and cultural conditions behind institutional change.

Both approaches derive from Dankwart Rustow's 1970 paper on transitions, which rejected the assumption that the causes of democratization are also the causes of consolidation. Rustow thereby created space for choice or agency; but this kind of approach either leads to abstract rational models like those used in neoclassical economics where choice becomes mere maximization, or ends up in case-by-case studies that lack predictive capacity. More recently, Charles Boix (2003), Boix and Stokes (2003) and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006) made contributions to the democratic transitions

issue that are related to the argument in this paper and made knowledge on the subject to advance, but they just show that democracy is less threatening to the rich once economic development takes place, while my argument is historical: is that the capitalist class is the first social class not to veto democracy and, second, that a consolidated democracy is only possible after the capitalist revolution takes place.³

This paper is part of the tradition of thought, the historical one that looks for new historical facts and the structural, cultural and institutional determinants of social and political action. It is akin to the approaches of Barrington Moore (1966), Samuel Huntington (1991), Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens and John Stephens (1992) who look for structural forces behind democratic transitions and consolidations.⁴ Yet Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens observed, “the causal forces that stand behind the relationship between development and democracy remain, in effect, in a black box” [(1992), p. 29]. In fact, capitalist development and democracy appear together but there is no clear explanation why. In this paper I hope to offer a contribution toward opening the black box and toward understanding democratic consolidation.

III. – TWO CONCEPTS: DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALIST REVOLUTION

In late nineteenth or early twentieth century the more economically advanced countries adopted universal suffrage, and democracy became finally the dominant regime. Table 1 presents the first countries to adopt universal suffrage up to the 1940s. The first was New Zealand, in 1893. The adoption of the universal right to vote does not mean that a country has completed its transition to democracy, but in most advanced countries this was the case. Such countries had long had constitutional or rule-of-law regimes. Freedom of thought and association and regular elections had also existed for some time. When the property-less and women were finally entitled to vote, the minimum conditions for democracy materialized. As Wanderley G. Santos (1998) observes,

³ For a recent survey on transitions to democracy from a rational choice standpoint, see Barbara Geddes (2007).

⁴ Samuel Huntington, from a conservative standpoint.

the number of voters doubled, or more than doubled, in most countries in the year that universal suffrage is adopted. The fact that democracy is a twentieth century phenomenon is quite clear from Table 1. The question is why only at that moment democracy became a viable form of government.

TABLE 1
**The First Countries to Adopt Universal Suffrage
(up to the 1940s)**

Year	Country
1893	New Zealand
1902	Australia
1906	Finland
1913	Norway
1915	Denmark and Iceland
1918	Austria and Luxembourg
1919	Germany and the Netherlands
1920	United States
1921	Canada and Sweden
1923	Ireland and Uruguay
1928	United Kingdom
1929	Ecuador
1931	Sri Lanka
1932	Brazil
1934	Cuba
1937	Philippines
1942	Dominican Republic
1944	Jamaica
1945	Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary
1946	France, Japan, Turkey, Poland, Albany, Romy, Panama, and Malta
1947	Argentina, Venezuela, and Pakistan,
1948	Belgium, Israel, South Korea, and Suriname
1949	Chile and Costa Rica

Sources: Santos (1998) and the Laboratory of Experimental Studies based on Nohlen (1993), Gorvin (1989), and Lane, McKay and Newton (1997).

It is time, now, to make clear two basic concepts that are in the core of this paper: the concept of democracy and of capitalist revolution. *Democracy* is the political regime in which all adult citizens vote (universal suffrage), elections are free and regular, and the constitution assures the rule of law involving principally freedom of association, of speech and of information, and protection of minority rights. In other words, I understand as democratic the political regime that satisfies Dahl's criteria defining a polyarchy [(1971), (1989), p. 233].⁵ This is a "minimal" concept of democracy, and corresponds to the first historical form of democracy – liberal democracy. As political development takes place, the quality of democracy is expected to improve, but we need a minimal concept of democracy to distinguish the authoritarian from the democratic state and be able to discuss democratic transition and consolidation. In this paper, I do not discuss the quality of democracy.⁶ When we discuss democratic transition and consolidation, we should not ask more of democracy than a political regime is able to offer, nor fall back on the old distinction between formal and substantive democracy.

We also need a short definition of capitalist revolution. The *capitalist revolution* represented a tectonic shift in the history of civilization. It began with the commercial revolution and the emergence of the bourgeoisie, advanced with the formation of the nation-states, and got "completed" in each country with the industrial revolution. It involved, at the economic level, the transition from the appropriation of economic surplus with the use of direct force by an oligarchy controlling the state to a mode of self-enrichment in a market-coordinated economy; it turned profit into the economic motive, and capital accumulation embodying technical progress into the means to that end. At the political level, it brought the transition from the absolute state to the liberal state – the one that assures the rule of law but is not yet democratic. At the administrative level, it implied the separation of the public from the private patrimony, or, in other words, the transition from the patrimonial state, where rent seeking was part of the game, to the modern bureaucratic state where rent-seeking turned a disease. With the capi-

⁵ But note that, although I believe that Dahl's distinction between modern democracy and polyarchy is useful in certain circumstances to distinguish an ideal form of government from reality, and also from Greek democracy, in this paper I use "modern democracy" or just "democracy" and "polyarchy" as synonyms.

⁶ Guillermo O'Donnell (2004) wrote an encompassing essay on the quality of democracy.

talist revolution, the new nation-states were able to develop three basic institutions: the modern state apparatus or public administration, the legal-constitutional system, and the national market. At the cultural level, it involved the transition from tradition and revelation, as sources of knowledge, to reason and scientific research. The capitalist revolution begins with the emergence of a bourgeois middle class in the cities since the thirteenth century in Italy and “ends” with the industrial revolution and the rise to the working class in late eighteenth century in England. After that we can view the capitalist revolution as “completed” in each country in so far as the appropriation of economic surplus ceases to take place principally through the control of the state to be achieved in the market.⁷

Marx made the classical analysis of the capitalist revolution, but, since he was concerned with the transition to socialism, he was unable to derive from capitalism its two major political consequences: the formation of the nation-states,⁸ and the emergence of the democratic regimes. Barrington Moore [(1996), p. 426] advanced in this: he made the classical analysis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution – he showed “the English Civil War, the French Revolution and the American Civil War as the stages of *the* bourgeois-democratic revolution”. Writing one hundred years later, when democracy in England, France and United States was consolidate, but the experience of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in other countries, recent, he asked which had been the historical conditions in capitalist development that led to democracy. It was clear to him that the capitalist or bourgeois revolution was the central condition. Yet, since this fact was already well known when he wrote, his more specific question was which other conditions were required – conditions that were present principally in England. His innovative response was that, in the sixteen and the seventeenth centuries, the advance of commerce and the increased demand of absolutist rulers for cash to finance wars led the English landed aristocracy to turn to a form of commercial farming and to a political alliance with the bourgeoisie. His illuminating theory relating liberalism and democracy to the emergence of the “gentry” – a nume-

⁷ According to Marx [(1864), p. 1024-25] the social formation turns dominantly capitalist when relative surplus value (profit involving technological progress) turns the dominant form of surplus appropriation.

⁸ The first task – to derive from the capitalist revolution the nation-state – was principally done by Charles Tilly (1975, 1992).

rous proprietary stratum below the aristocracy and above the rich peasants and the new bourgeoisie – is well known. But he underlines that, above the gentry, the overlords also got involved in commercial agriculture and in political coalition with the bourgeoisie. For him, to reduce the bourgeois-democratic revolution just to a conflict between these two classes won by the bourgeoisie is “a caricature” (p. 428). While in a country like Germany, the aristocracy conserved throughout the nineteenth century a firm position against democracy, Moore underlines that the radical opposition to democracy was a marginal current in the British aristocratic class. Yet, he underestimates the liberal resistance to democracy in Britain, or in the United States, or in France – a resistance that in name of the risk of the “dictatorship of the majority” delayed for a century democracy.

IV. – THE BASIC ARGUMENT

The transition to democracy in the first democratic countries was the outcome of four historical new facts, among which the capitalist revolution is the central one. Before, the aristocratic elites exercised an absolute veto over democracy; after it, the new bourgeois elites did not adhere immediately to democracy but ceased to veto it – and eventually turned interested in it. Barrington Moore already remarked this fact. Discussing the political coalition of the English bourgeoisie with the landed aristocracy, Moore (p. 424) is clear:

A vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has become an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy; no bourgeois, no democracy... the English bourgeoisie from the seventeenth through much of the nineteenth century had a maximum material interest in human freedom. (p. 418 and 424)

My central concern in this paper is not in discussing the historical conditions that proved to be more favorable to liberalism and democracy in some countries than in others. Yet, it is central to my argument bourgeoisie’s interest in democracy – the fact that bourgeoisie will be a class that, differently from the previous ruling classes or oligarchies, originally did not oppose and eventually sponsored democracy. Before the capitalist revolution, production was organized at the family level,

and economic surplus was appropriated through ownership of land and particularly the use of political power to tax people, to reduce them to slavery or servitude. In order to be rich or to own land one was supposed to be politically powerful, to be part of the oligarchy controlling the state. The distribution of income was essentially a political question. Land property had also a political origin. To obtain wealth and prestige, one had first to be politically powerful – share control of the state. Dominant groups appropriated economic surplus out of land rent and war; they fought for booty, they enslaved the defeated or imposed heavy taxes on the colonies, and they appropriated land. As society changed from tribal to more complex forms, like city-states and empires, taxation became increasingly important. The military aristocracy, with the support of a patrimonial bureaucracy and a religious hierarchy, appropriated the economic surplus from merchants, while landowners collected rents from peasants. Religious legitimacy was always an essential part of the process, but the very existence of empires and dominant oligarchies depended on their capacity to retain political power and wage war. In the last form of pre-capitalist state organization, the patrimonial state, taxation was essential to finance a court aristocracy and a patrimonial bureaucracy. There was no separation between the public and the private patrimony: to be economically rich depended on being politically dominant. The poor, identified since Aristotle as the sponsors of democracy, would often press for freedom, for some sort of democracy, but the dominant group resisted, resorting to all forms of violence to keep the state under their political control. Since markets had just a marginal existence, there was no other way to distribute wealth and income than through the control of the state. Occasionally the people or the merchants could gain some power, and establish some form of republic, but the powerful interests involved in political power would soon corrupt and wipe out the new regime.

After the industrial revolution this situation changed dramatically. Now, constitutional and market systems coordinate society. Now profits and high salaries gain relevance in making people rich. The state continues to play a role in the acquisition and distribution of income, but is no longer a condition for the existence of the economic elite. It is not easy to determine whether a country underwent its capitalist revolution, but a good measure is whether the patrimonialist confusion between the private and the public patrimony or rent-seeking still plays a major role in making people rich.

The capitalist revolution did not create democracy, but made it possible. The new capitalist class could now do what the previous domi-

nant classes could not: it had the option of *not vetoing* democracy since the absolute control of the state was no longer a necessary condition of its wealth. From this moment on, the rejection of authoritarian regimes gathered pace, the consensus against democracy disappeared. As John Dunn [(1979), p. 8] observes, the “dismissal of the viability of democracy was a fair summary of a European intellectual consensus which reached back at least to the Principate of Augustus, it was a consensus which disappeared with surprising speed between 1776 and 1850 in Europe itself”. Thus, everything changed with the long historical process that was the capitalist revolution. As the market economy prevailed, the new dominant group no longer needed the means of violence or control of the state to appropriate the economic surplus. According to the following passage from Celso Furtado, we can see also the origins of my argument [(1976), p. 33]:

Two forms of appropriating surplus seem to have existed since the beginning of historical times. On one side is what we call the *authoritarian* form, which consists in extracting the surplus through coercion. On the other side we have the *mercantile* form, that is, the appropriation of surplus through exchange... The surplus utilized to appropriate another surplus is a *capital*, which entitles us to say that all socio-economic formations in which the surplus is predominantly captured through exchange belong to the *genus* capitalism.

In the historical moment that each national society changes from authoritarian to mercantile or capitalist appropriation of the surplus, state power ceased to be a necessary condition for acquiring wealth. States continue to play a major economic role, which, however, is no longer to support oligarchic appropriation, but to create the institutional conditions for investment and profit realization in the market. The control of the state continued to be crucial to the new ruling class, but businessmen could leave to politicians and bureaucrats the responsibility of governing and of protecting militarily the new nation-states from foreign aggression. At this moment, when argument and persuasion finally prevailed over force, the era of politics began. Now, people had the possibility of discussing and creating liberal and democratic institutions. The eighteenth century had already experienced a hint of it when some thinkers contrasted the harshness of aristocracy with the softness of capitalism. Montesquieu, above all, underlined commerce's

“douceur”.⁹ Albert Hirschman (1977), commenting on this view, observes that while the warrior aristocrats were subject to great and sometimes heroic passions, the bourgeoisie was limited to more modest and moderate traits. Analyzing Shaftsbury’s, Hutcheson’s and Hume’s analyses, he shows how these philosophers viewed economic activity as a “calm passion”.

England was the first country to form a strong nation-state and complete its industrial revolution; it is not by accident that it was also the first nation-state and the first liberal political regime in the world. In the early nineteenth century, England was ready for liberalism, not for democracy. The first veto on democracy, which reflected the need for authoritarian appropriation of the surplus, had been eliminated, but fear of expropriation by the poor remained strong. Thus, civil rights could be assured, not political rights.

V. – THREE ADDITIONAL NEW HISTORICAL FACTS

It would take 100 years after the completion of the Industrial Revolution to English elites admit universal suffrage. The second historical new fact that opened room for democracy was the bourgeoisie losing fear of expropriation by a majority of workers winning elections. The new capitalist ruling class, formed by a large middle class and a small upper class, will be originally liberal. Its members strove for profits and for the guarantee of their hard-won civil rights. Their memory of the arbitrary rule that characterized absolutism was alive and well. With the liberal order, they had ceased to be subjects to become citizens endowed with rights. Yet, just as it took time for the aristocracy to grant full citizenship to the bourgeoisie, so it would take time for the new business class to accept that workers had full citizenship by the institution of universal suffrage. The new capitalist class was liberal but not democratic. Although the seeds of democracy were in the liberal state, classical liberals fought democracy in the name of freedom. The argument was that freedom and equality conflicted one with another, that equality of rights – which is a condition for democracy – would be intrinsically inconsistent with civic liberties, in so far as

⁹ According to Montesquieu (1748: 609) “où il y a du commerce, il y a de mœurs doux” (“wherever there is commerce, manners are soft”).

equality of rights would lead to the tyranny of the majority and the denial of freedom. As Charles Lindblom [(1977), p. 163] underlines, the first modern political philosophers “are all liberals first, and democrats, second, if at all”.

The fear that universal suffrage would bring a dictatorship of the majority’s weakened gradually as the workers participated in elections and did not demonstrate such purpose. Workers proved not to be revolutionary: they demanded higher wages, increased labor protection, and democracy rather than socialism. Progressively capitalists realized that the workers did not vote as a bloc, and that the majority of workers would not vote for their expropriation. They observed that democratic politics tended to divide political parties ideologically, but the differences among them would tend to be increasingly small as all had to converge to an ideological center identified with on going social system. In other words, they saw that a clear tendency to democratic elections involved change of policies but not of economic regime.

While the first and the second new historical facts opening the way for democracy were on the supply side of democratic participation, the third and the fourth are on the demand side: the demand of the middle classes and of the working class. The rise of the middle classes is the third new historical. The existence of this large layer between the rich and the poor worked as a main stabilizing factor thus circumventing the classical problem of early democracies: political instability.¹⁰ After the completion of the capitalist revolution, the bourgeoisie was a large middle class that required formal rules that permitted that its members competed among themselves in achieving political power. Democracy emerged eventually as the ensemble of such rules. As industrialization advanced, a new middle class also emerged – the professional middle class – also began to represent an increasing share of the total population, and their members also demanded democracy. The fact that the two middle classes were situated between the rich and the poor was also a reason for the rich to be less fearful of the poor and accept universal suffrage.

The fourth and final historical fact that led modern societies to democracy was the pressure of the poor or of the working class for democracy. Despite all their internal contradictions, democracy was

¹⁰ For the classical philosophers the main reason why they view negatively democracy was the fact that this political regime was unstable and, so, inclined to demagoguery.

always a demand of the poor when they were able to express themselves politically. Integrated in large factories under the capitalist system, part of the poor turned into the working or salaried class, became better organized and more demanding. They demanded higher wages, increased labor protection, and democracy. Goran Therborn's essay on this subject (1977) remains the basic reference; Ruth Collier's 1999 book on the working class and elites in Western Europe and South America offers a major contribution to the theme. According to Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens [(1992), p. 8] "the working class was the most consistently pro-democracy force... The landed upper-classes which were dependent on a large supply of cheap labor were the most consistently anti-democratic force. The bourgeoisie we found to be generally supportive of the installation of constitutional and representative regime, but opposed extending political inclusion to the lower classes". When democracy won, it was a victory of the poor. By the end of the nineteenth century, the arguments against universal suffrage or on the risk of the dictatorship of majority had lost their force, while the demand for democracy increased, and the first countries that granted the universal suffrage became the first real democracies.¹¹ As Dahl [(1989), p. 234] asserts, "although some of the institutions of polyarchy appeared in a number of English-speaking and European countries in the nineteenth century, in no country did the demos become inclusive until the twentieth century".

VI. – RATIONAL MOTIVES

Although democracy was originally a demand from the poor or the working class and the middle classes, it became gradually a rational option for the rich, provided that the liberal principles associated to the rule of law prevailed in the new democratic system. Unlike the old aristocracy of landowners, the business class depended less on the state. Therefore, businessmen gradually changed their views on democracy either because they were under pressure, or because they ceased to fear it, or still because they understood that they could continue to rule in

¹¹ In the United States, universal manhood suffrage had existed since the first part of the nineteenth century, probably because the Americans were the first to shake off the fear of expropriation.

the new system. First, the capitalist class realized that the poor did not really represent a threat because they did not have a real alternative to the capitalist system. Second, they realized that democracy did not really endanger property and profits. Third, it became conscious that a democratic regime could be more stable, more effective in assuring social order, than just a liberal state in which ultimate power was in the hands of a sovereign or a ruler. In other words, unlike to the old aristocracy, the new rich were not intrinsically opposed to democracy; they were intrinsically liberal, but since capitalism was not a zero-sum game, they realized that liberalism combined with democracy – liberal democracy – would adequately protect their interests regardless of the fact that it also protected the poor and the middle classes.

Yet, differently from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), I do not view the demand of workers or of the poor as the central cause of democracy; that was, rather, the fact that the bourgeoisie was the first ruling class that relaxed its veto over it. It was only after that that the role of the poor, and also of the middle classes demanding more participation, became strategic. The arguments brought these two authors and also by Charles Boix (2003) and Boix and Stokes (2003) to the democratic transitions debate are related to the one I am presenting, but they intend to find *a priori* rational motives, while I limit my self to use the reason behind historically, *a posteriori*. In distinguishing the model here presented from rational choice models, it is necessary to consider the *new* historical facts, because only new fact may explain a new historical phenomenon, as it is democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson [(2006), p. XII] argue that economic development causes democracy because, when income distribution is more equal, the elites' fear of redistribution – the fear that democracy will mean higher taxes on the rich – will wane. Thus, in relating democracy to economic development and income distribution, they assume that there is a linear relation between development and equality. But this is not the case. Often inequality increases, as we saw in the last 30 years. And even if we accept that some distribution tends to occur, progress in this direction is too small to serve as explanation for democracy. On the other hand, they ask: "since democracy will bring a shift of power in favor of citizens, why should the elite ever create such a set of institutions? We argue that this only occurs because the disenfranchised citizens can threaten the elite and force it to make concessions". This is too simple and explains little. They add to the correct claim that the poor and the emerging new middle classes won democracy a second and doubtful claim: that since

the transition to democracy the poor keep the rich permanently under threaten. Thus, the rationality behind is a rationality based on fear, not on the on the new forms of production and distribution brought by the capitalist revolution.

In the growing literature on democratic transition, Gerard Alexander's [(2002), p. 57)] presents a broad picture of the consolidation process. Yet he fails to offer a solution to the very problem that he defines as central: "what leads the right to expect its well-being and safety to be predictably better secured in democracy than under authoritarian rule?" The question is in agreement with the model presented in this paper, because it locates the problems in the preferences of the rich or of the capitalist class toward democracy, and because Alexander shows that this class may rationally change its preferences as new factors emerge. As it happened in Brazil, in the early 1960s democracy was not rational for the business class, but it became rational in the late 1970s, when the fear of communism had disappeared. Yet, as Alexander does not adopt an historical approach, he does not have an answer to the question he correctly poses. Alexander [(2002), p. 66-67] asks on what conditions will political actors make the forecast that the expected payoffs from democracy are predictably higher than those from authoritarianism, and he responds: several factors reduce the right's expected payoff from authoritarian projects, "but they can do so only on a basis actors perceive as temporary, and therefore they can induce *provisional* support for democracy." If he had adopted an historical approach he probably would have been more conclusive. He almost does that, as he underlines the role of structural factors in democratic transition and consolidation, but he eventually fails to identify them. He asserts that change happened "when they [the European conservatives] believed that the left became predictably and not merely tactically moderate". This fact corresponds more or less to the second historical condition that I advanced in this paper for democratic consolidation: the loss of fear of expropriation on the part of the rich. It does not explain, however, why the capitalist class could change its view on the behavior of the left or of the workers, while the previous ruling classes could not.

In endorsing democracy, the rich lost political power, but not much. They knew they could count on conservative and even on social-democratic political parties to protect them since they controlled, or exercised veto power on investment and economic growth. They kept control of the form of financing electoral campaigns, and of the media. They

compromised on political power but not on liberal political values and principles: they made sure that the protection of minority and civil rights remained core elements in each national constitution.

This model of democratic transition and consolidation that I am presenting makes sense on two conditions: first, the understanding on the part of workers that a socialist revolution was not rational; second, that a satisfactory long-term rate of profit was assured to capitalists. Adam Przeworski [(1985), p. 139, 177, 180] argues persuasively for the workers' rationality in refusing to support a socialist revolution. According to him, workers in advanced democracies had strong motives to feel no attraction for a revolution expropriating the rich; if workers had the right to vote, they would rationally vote for socialist political parties committed to the socialist revolution. Yet they do not, because, on one hand, as long as capitalists control investments, they "are in a unique position in the capitalist system: they represent the future universal interests while interests of all other groups appear as particularistic and hence inimical to future developments". On the other hand, according to Przeworski, workers did not have the assurance that moving to socialism would immediately improve their material conditions. On the contrary, they are not certain that socialism is more efficient than capitalism and, even if it is, the transition to socialism may involve a deterioration of workers' welfare. Thus, he concludes, since "workers have the option of improving their material condition by cooperating with capitalists, the socialist orientation cannot be deduced from the material interests of workers".

The second condition to this model is that, on one hand, there is not an efficient alternative to capitalism, and, on the other hand, that capitalism is not a win-loss game, but a win-win game, where both capitalists and workers may gain. Thus, capitalist societies develop technologies, institutions, and ideologies that assure a satisfactory long-term rate of profit, and, for that reason, workers usually do not support the socialist revolution. Economic development depends on rate of investment, which, on its turn, depends on the expected rate of profit. Entrepreneurs will keep investing in so as the expected rate of profit is satisfactory, or, in Herbert Simons' (1957) words, is at a "satisfying" long-run level – and this what happened historically. After the industrial revolution, the rate of profit did not fall as predicted by Ricardo and Marx, but kept reasonably constant at a satisfactory level from the point of view of investing entrepreneurs. Why is the rate of profit constant in the long term? In his model of growth and distribution

Bresser-Pereira (1986, 2004) argued that contrarily to the classical theory the rate of profit, not the wage rate, should be viewed as given or constant in the long-term growth process, while wages should be seen as the residuum. Proceeding from the inversion of the classical distribution model, he showed in the long-term, the profit rate tends to be kept as a satisfactory level, while wages increase at a smaller, equal, or higher rate than productivity depending on the type of technical progress: capital using, neutral, or capital saving. Given the fact that capital using technology is only dominant in the beginning of the development process, when mechanization, the substitution of capital for labor, is dominant in relation to the substitution of cheaper machines for more costly ones, salaries tend to increase as productivity rises, what makes socialist revolutions unlikely in capitalist societies.¹²

VII. – TWO CONDITIONS

These two conditions reinforce one another. And made the capitalist class increasingly confident in democracy. The increase in the direct and social benefits entailed by democracy would not be a burden as long as they did not threaten the long-run profit rate. On the other hand, as Keynes demonstrated, wage increases could sustain the profit rate to the extent that they kept effective demand sustained. As it became rational for workers individually, not just as a class, to support capitalism and to fight for democracy and for social rights, it also became rational for capitalists to support democracy. Workers increasingly understood the limits of their wage demands, while capitalists increasingly became persuaded that democracy could facilitate workers' demands but, as a trade-off, provide a legitimate political system more able than authoritarian rule to assure political stability. In addition, capitalists realized that democracy made the rule of law much more secure – and nothing is more important for business activity than a stable constitutional and legal environment.

¹² I am aware that, since the mid 1970s, wages stopped growing with productivity. This happened because, as I argued elsewhere, the class coalition that I am assuming (Fordism or the Welfare State) was broken, and a neoliberal coalition of rentier capitalists and financiers turn dominant. The consequence was the 2008 global financial crisis.

In this model, the rise of a large bourgeois middle class and a professional middle class entered as a moderating factor reducing conflict between the rich and the poor. Yet, if we understand that the middle class was part of the expanded ruling class that characterizes modern societies, we immediately realize that they also had a major interest in democracy. Being much larger than the old aristocracy, the new ruling class formed by the rich and the upper middle class needed institutions permitting groups within it to share political power or to rotate in government in an orderly way. Under these circumstances, democracy was the obvious choice, collectively and for each member; democratic institutions created conditions for the resolution of their internal conflicts. While oligarchies in pre-capitalist societies often “resolved” their internal conflicts through violence and murder, the capitalist and professional middle classes found in democracy a better and more secure way for achieving the same outcome.

Thus, gradually, all major political actors realized that democracy was the form of government that was most favorable to business as well as to the workers. The times when greedy and turbulent factions, referred to by the Greek philosophers, plagued democracy were over. For a long time, democracies that followed the steps discussed here would confront crises and unrest, but they embodied a sizable relative increase in political stability. Workers, capitalists, and the middle classes informally signed a new social or political contract. The fight for justice, the condemnation of corruption and privilege, and the possibility of constructing more efficient and more just models of capitalism continue to be major political tasks, but democracy has become established as the universally preferred form of conducting such republican efforts.

VIII. – PREDICTING TRANSITIONS AND CONSOLIDATIONS

The capitalist revolution model here presented is useful for predicting the overall transition to democracy, but when individual cases are examined, there are many exceptions. As Ruth Collier [(1999), p. 20] argues, many are the paths to democracy. Foreign influence may lead to democratic transitions that otherwise would not occur (consider Haiti, for instance), or, on the opposite side, successful authoritarian

rulers may stay in government much beyond what the evolution of economic and social variables would lead us to predict, as in the case of Singapore. Today there is a large number of countries that, not having completed their capitalist revolution, are still democratic – either because of foreign pressure, or/and because nationals also don't see better alternative.

The model presented in this paper aims to offer a general explanation of democratic transition and consolidation based on the assumption that the same theory should explain both phenomena, but is on firmer ground on the second than on the first. Historically, a full change from state to market appropriation of the economic surplus is a necessary and sufficient condition for democratic consolidation, not democratic transition. No country experienced democratic consolidation before having changed the coordination of the economy from the state to the market, and before reducing substantially the patrimonialist aspects of its state, but the same cannot be said in relation to democratic transitions.

Thus, the capitalist revolution model here presented is effective in predicting that an increasing number of countries will turn democratic as they grow and complete their capitalist revolutions, but fails to be a secure case-by-case predictor of democratic transitions. In the case, however, of democratic consolidation, the model is strong also on a country-by-country basis. After a country that has the necessary conditions for democracy undergoes democratic transition, its democracy is consolidated: the probability that it will fall back in authoritarian rule turns vanishingly small. The tragic failure of the Weimar democracy in Germany is an exception to our rule. After the defeat in World War I, the transition to democracy took place in a country that had already completed its capitalist revolution in the times of Bismarck; nevertheless, it fell back to authoritarian rule a few years later. How can we explain that? Was fascism or Nazism the necessary outcome of late capitalist revolutions, as some argued? Or was it a reaction to the communist revolution in Russia? I believe that the first explanation is outright wrong, while the second makes more sense in Germany and Italy where the capitalist revolution had just ended and there were strong socialist political parties around. In the case of Italy, I believe that Mussolini's fascism was eventually a reaction to the fear of communism, but it does not represent an exception to the capitalist revolution theory because previously to fascism Italy could hardly be called a democracy. The Weimar republic, however, was democratic. It is,

however, difficult to say that the German people “conquered democracy” in 1919; actually, it was defeated in a major war in 1918. Following, Germany was miserably treated by the winning countries in the Treaty of Versailles and experienced hyperinflation in the next years. Thus, when Adolph Hitler took power, he profited from a deep resentment of the German people to resume war. World War II was a continuation of the first one.

Theories on democratic consolidation usually just list the characteristics that are common to consolidated democracies, instead of explaining democratic consolidation. In relation to democratic consolidation, we find the same theoretical dividing line between the historical or socio-economic approach and the processes and leadership approach that exists in the discussion of democratic transitions. Radical manifestations of the later current turn democratic consolidations void of historical content. Scott Mainwaring [(1992), p. 327] is right when he notes that “the most important dividing line in contemporary work on democracy is between those who see it primarily as a result of propitious economic, social, or cultural conditions and those who see it primarily as a result of political institutions, processes, and leadership”. Adopting the former approach, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan [(1996), p. 55] tried to encompass all forms of transitions and consolidations with the help of four types of non-democratic regime whose characteristics would influence decisively the transition and consolidation paths. From that, they described the typical institutional, cultural, and economic framework existing just before transition in one of the four types of non-democratic regime, namely, the authoritarian: “a robust civil society, a legal culture supportive of constitutionalism and the rule-of-law, a usable state bureaucracy that operates within professional norms, and a reasonably well-institutionalized economic society.” According to them, Spain, for example, presented such conditions in the early 1970s. The two authors do not refer to capitalist revolution, but their view is consistent with the one I am proposing here since no country that did not undergo a capitalist revolution will have such characteristics. In relation to the Brazilian democratic transition, Francisco Weffort (1984) argued that it turned conservative as the process eventually came under the control of the business industrial class. This indeed happened [Bresser-Pereira, (1978, 1984)], and is part of the explanation why the Brazilian democracy is a consolidated democracy. Scott Mainwaring (2000), looking for the causes of the increased survivability of democracies in Latin America, sees three factors

explaining it: "the first explanation evolves around the structural transformations unleashed by modernization... second, from left to right of the spectrum, political attitudes changed... Finally, international support for democracy, especially from the United States, increased..." This is also a historical approach to democratic consolidation consistent with the view presented here.

Thus, according to the capitalist revolution model, when a country makes its transition to democracy after having completed its industrial revolution, we may predict that it will probably remain democratic, because only a country that fulfilled this condition will have the social structure, the political culture and the institutions that are required by a consolidated democracy. A country may try to import democratic institutions, but it is impossible either to import the social structure and the culture that makes democracy rational to economic and political elites, or to import the respective democratic culture that is necessary to a consolidated regime. The more fully capitalist a country is, the more consolidated its democratic regime will tend to be.

One can say that the hypothesis here developed is not empirically falseable due to the difficulty of defining the moment in which a country completed its capitalist revolution. Yet, I believe that there is already sufficient evidence that this claim is true. Historical experience abundantly shows that, after a country completes its capitalist revolution, it will tend to become democratic; subsequently, when it becomes democratic, its democracy will be consolidated. But, besides this general historical experience, would we dispose of some stronger evidence that a country that completed the historical requirements for democracy, and democratized, will not fall back into authoritarianism? This is an interpretative paper using a broad brush to identify a common long-term trajectory. I have not carried out new research on the subject. The evidence already available, however, strongly supports the hypothesis presented here on the consolidation of democracy. The entire literature linking democracy with economic development actually supports it. After the classic paper by Lipset, all the research confirmed the basic finding. If are the more economically advanced a nation-state that have for longer democracy as their political regime, this means the more developed economically is a country, the more consolidated will be its democracy.

The research by Adam Przeworski and associates (2000) on economic development and democracy offers a definitive substantiation for the strong relation between capitalist revolution and democratic conso-

litation. In their study of democracy for the period 1950-1990, they concluded that there is no relationship between levels of economic development and transitions to democracy. The claim is radical, but concurs with the caveat that I have already made, namely, that in predicting democratic transitions the completion of the capitalist revolution faces many exceptions deriving from earlier transitions. Yet, from their research we can infer that democratic consolidation is strongly associated with economic development. Besides showing the positive relation between economic development and democratic consolidation, they claim, based solidly on their data that “where they are established, democracies are much more likely to endure in more highly developed countries”: in rich democracies (above US\$6,000.00 per capita, per annum) they conclude that the probability that the regime will fall back into dictatorship is practically zero. If we accept that the assumption that non-oil exporting countries with per capita incomes above US\$6,000.00 per annum have completed their capitalist revolution (a reasonable or conservative one), it follows that the completion of the modernization process implies democratic consolidation. As I have already acknowledged, there may be a few exceptions to this rule, but Przeworski and associates did not find any.

IX. – CONCLUSION

Summing up, democratic transition was the outcome of four historical new facts all related to the capitalist revolution, involving the removal of the two vetoes exercised by the rich. Additionally, the argument developed here depends on two conditions: workers’ lack of commitment to a socialist revolution, and the long-run constancy of the rate of profit while wages and salaries rise with productivity. When a country satisfies all these requirements and transition takes place, the resulting democracy will be a consolidated one. The same theory that explains why democracy became widespread in the twentieth century explains consolidation more specifically, country by country.

The model of democratic consolidation presented here does not establish a definite causal connection. Yet it shows that in a society where profits and salaries earned in the market become the dominant forms of surplus appropriation – the main indicator that the capitalist revolution in a given country has been completed – elites cease to veto

democracy. Subsequently, as voting rights start to be extended to the poor, capitalist elites realize that this change does not really threaten property rights and contracts. Workers, in their turn, increase their demands for political participation, but do so moderately. Eventually, elites realize, based on their own and other countries' experience, that democracy better promotes their interests than authoritarian regimes: it is more stable and provides rules for its many members to share and rotate power. The middle classes, whom grow extraordinarily, feel the same. In other words, after an industrial revolution makes the appropriation of the economic surplus dependent not on state control but on the market, authoritarian regimes cease to be attractive to capitalists. In a second moment, the professional class receiving salaries instead of wages grows and shares power with the capitalists. It too has no reason to prefer authoritarianism. Eventually, democracy becomes rational for all classes, despite the dissatisfaction that sharing power always causes.

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